American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Franchises by Schein, David et al.
Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 6
2-1-2017
American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums
and Pro Sports Franchises
David Schein
James Phillips
Caroline Rider
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Schein, James Phillips & Caroline Rider, American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Franchises, 20 Rich. Pub.
Int. L. Rev. 63 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/6
Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 6
2-1-2017
American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums
and Pro Sports Franchises
David Schein
James Phillips
Caroline Rider
Follow this and additional works at: h6p://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Public Law and Legal 5eory Commons
5is Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Schein, James Phillips & Caroline Rider, American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Franchises, 20 Rich. Pub.
Int. L. Rev. 63 (2017).
Available at: h6p://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/6
1
Schein et al.: American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Fran
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017
 * David D. Schein, MBA, J.D., Ph.D., is the Director of Graduate Programs 
at the Cameron School of Business at the University of St. Thomas. 
** James D. Phillips, J.D., Ph.D., is Associate Dean at the School of Man-
agement at Marist College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Richmond. 
*** Caroline V. Rider, J.D., is the MBA Director and Associate Professor 
of Management at Marist College.  
63 
AMERICAN CITIES HELD HOSTAGE: PUBLIC STADIUMS 
AND PRO SPORTS FRANCHISES 
David D. Schein*, James D. Phillips**, & Caroline Rider*** 
  
1
Schein et al.: American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Fran
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017 2
Richmond Public Interest Law Revi w, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/6
64 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  
 
ABSTRACT 
The price of building professional sports facilities, sometimes greater 
than $1 billion, is often paid in part by taxpayers. But several persuasive 
studies by economists have found that the economic benefits of such a fa-
cility do not outweigh the costs to taxpayers. Nonetheless, municipal gov-
ernments continue to fork over massive amounts of taxpayer dollars for 
such projects while a very limited number of individuals actually benefit 
from the construction. This Article highlights several recent examples of 
publicly-funded athletic venues which have failed to return profits to any-
one except the sports teams’ owners and limited corporate interests and 
discusses the legal infrastructures which can be used to combat this per-
ceived misapplication of public funds. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the third decade of a publicly financed stadium-
building boom. Several of the recent projects exceed $1 billion.1 Most of 
the stadiums have been built with substantial public funds and support.2 A 
continuing flow of scholarly and business articles has documented the fact 
that most of the new stadiums have not produced net economic gain to the 
host areas as civic leaders and sports team owners promised. Despite this 
growing evidence, such stadiums continue to be built. This Article present 
an ethical and legal analysis of the current stadium situation, and proposes a 
multi-part solution supported by the evidence to date. In Part I, the authors 
review the reports of the economic impact of such stadiums. In Part II, the 
authors analyze several of the recent major sports stadium financing trans-
actions. In Part III, the authors examine several tools used by the propo-
nents of stadiums to provide financing and avoid legal challenges, includ-
ing: tax-exempt public bonds, condemnation of private lands, and anti-trust 
exemptions for major sports teams. Part IV examines possible strategies 
that might be adopted to prevent the abuse of American cities by major 
sports teams. This section includes a legal analysis of court and legislative 
actions that limit the Kelo v. City of New London decision that allowed em-                                                             
1 A Look at the World’s Billion Dollar Stadiums, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 15, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://pro32.ap.org/article/look-worlds-billion-dollar-sports-stadiums.  
2 See infra appendix I, for a list of stadiums built or renovated between 2000 and 2015. 
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inent domain for private use rather than public use. This Article concludes 
with suggestions for future research and analysis.  
I. REPORTED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MAJOR SPORTS STADIUMS 
“Most of the large and growing literature on the public financing of 
sports stadiums concludes that the costs far exceed the benefits.”3 This sen-
tence begins an article reviewing the public goods created by a National 
Football League (“NFL”) team. The article references prior literature and 
then uses the Community Valuation Method (“CVM”) to determine the 
value that residents of Jacksonville, Florida, place on the NFL’s Jaguars.4 
The value that residents placed on the team was less than Jacksonville spent 
to refurbish the stadium that hosts the team. Given that the Jaguars are the 
only major sports team in the city, these results are surprising. “Coupled 
with the large body of literature finding negligible economic impact of 
teams and stadiums on city and regional economies, the CVM results 
strengthen the case against public subsidy.”5   
Some teams do own their own stadiums, such as the Washington Red-
skins and the Chicago Bulls. However, a current trend is for team owners to 
persuade or threaten their way into stadiums largely built at the public’s ex-
pense.6 Team owners, who would not otherwise see a reasonable return on 
their investment, are more likely to find a deal more attractive if they can 
have the stadium built with public funds or subsidies. To accomplish these 
substantial public subsidies, the team owners’ sales pitches are multi-
faceted. First, the team owners promise that the new stadiums will be re-
quired to keep a current pro sports team or to attract a new team. Second, 
the team owners argue that the economic benefits of the stadiums to the 
community will exceed the substantial costs involved. These promised ben-
efits are both financial and intangible. Financial benefits include promises 
of increased tourism, increased employment, and overall economic growth 
of the community hosting the new sports facility.7 The intangible benefits                                                              
3 Bruce K. Johnson, Michael J. Mondello & John C. Whitehead, The Value of Public Goods Generated 
by a National Football League Team, 21 J. SPORT MGMT. 1, 1 (2007). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 19. 
6 Bruce K. Johnson & John C. Whitehead, Value of Public Goods from Sports Stadiums: The CVM Ap-
proach, 18 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 48, 48-58 (2000); see All Things Considered: St. Louis Rams Con-
sider Move to Los Angeles, NPR (May 5, 2015) (on file with General OneFile); see also infra App. I. 
7 Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They Economically Justifiable? A Case 
Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 483, 491-492 (2002), 
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol10/iss3/2/. 
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include increased civic pride and maintaining or moving a city into a higher 
profile.8 These latter benefits are difficult to measure. One study that devel-
oped a quantitative formula to study civic pride found that even a measure-
able amount of civic pride did not equal public support for pro sports stadi-
ums.9 Team owners and politicians who seek public support based upon 
civic pride may find it increasingly difficult. Many American cities do not 
have a major sports team, but they still enjoy a positive public image and 
civic environment. An example is Austin, Texas.10  
The team owners promote these alleged benefits, despite growing evi-
dence that such stadiums do not meet their promised financial outcomes.11 
A 2003 study by economics professors Dennis Coats and Brad Humphreys 
predicted the current trends.12 The authors observed that sports stadiums 
have about a 30-year lifespan. At the time of the study, stadiums were ap-
proximately 65% publicly funded.13 They also observed that trends favor 
single sport stadiums versus earlier multi-use facilities that further expand 
the public outlay. This in turn renders the stadium subsidies increasingly 
difficult to justify from an economic standpoint. 
The authors suggested that the addition of amusement-park-like attrac-
tions drives up the cost of such facilities. These additional amusement facil-
ities may have a shorter lifespan than the 30 years for a traditional sports 
stadium—further complicating the overall economic justification.14  
One of the most famous multi-sport venues was the Houston Astrodome, 
completed in 1965, and host to the Houston Astros of Major League Base-
ball (“MLB”)15 and the Houston Oilers of the NFL. Additionally, the multi-
use facility was host to the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, one of the 
largest events of its kind, which is held annually between the football and 
baseball seasons. Currently, each major Houston pro sports team has its                                                              
8 Irwin A. Kishner & David R. Hoffman, Fields of Dreams: The Benefits of Public and Private Cooper-
ation in Financing Professional Sports Stadiums, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 20, 20 (2010). 
9 Peter A. Groothuis et al., Public Funding of Sports Stadiums: Public Choice or Civic Pride?, 39 E. 
ECON. J. 515, 524 (2004). 
10 Biz Carson, Little Big Town, 22 WIRED 52, 52 (2014). 
11 Johnson et al., supra note 3, at 49; Johnson et al., supra note 6. 
12 Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, Professional Sports Facilities, Franchises and Urban Econom-
ic Development, 3 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 335, 350 (2003). 
13 Id. at 338. 
14 Id. 
15 See Ryan Holeywell, Take a Glimpse at the Eerie Interior of Houston’s Astrodome, Rɪᴄᴇ U. 
Uʀʙᴀɴᴇᴅɢᴇ Bʟᴏɢ, (Oct. 27, 2015), http://urbanedge.blogs.rice.edu/2015/10/27/take-a-glimpse-at-the-
eerie-interior-of-houstons-astrodome/#.WBFHgC0rKUk. 
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own stadium, occupying valuable public lands and public capital.16 The 
building of single purpose stadiums intensifies the issue of how to dispose 
of huge facilities like the Astrodome that are outdated and now being re-
placed.17 
An interesting aspect of the publicly financed building boom is the im-
pact on the finances of the teams. Not surprisingly, a study of the impact of 
new stadiums reveals that NFL teams garnered substantial increases in rev-
enue and franchise value.18 Such findings underscore the question as to 
whether the public should continue to subsidize such ventures, when the 
economic value to the community is not realized and the teams are earning 
increasing profits. 
The special purpose stadiums not only consume greater public resources 
in most cases, but they may also not serve the teams as well as larger, multi-
use venues. From 2006 through 2011, the Houston Dynamo, a Major 
League Soccer (“MLS”) team, played at Robertson Field, located on the 
grounds of the University of Houston. This public university stadium was 
able to accommodate over 30,000 fans. BBVA Compass Stadium, a new 
soccer-only stadium with a maximum capacity of about 22,000 fans, 
opened in 2012. Although the team now has its own facility, the Houston 
Dynamo will never be able to match their earlier top-attendance games 
since the new soccer-only stadium is roughly 8,000 seats smaller than Rob-
ertson Field.19  
At the same time, a sociological analysis by sociology professors Kevin 
Delaney and Rick Eckstein suggests that public financing for stadiums has 
expanded, despite economic and other data not supporting such expendi-
tures, due to behind-the-scenes support by corporate executives.20 The theo-
ry behind the authors’ premise suggests that CEOs of major corporations 
find it easier to recruit high-level executives to a city with major sports 
                                                             
16 See THE OFFICIAL SITE FOR THE CITY OF HOUSTON, http://www.houstontx.gov/abouthouston/sports- 
rec.html (last visited on Oct. 2, 2016). 
17 See Andrew Dansby, Once a Symbol of Ambition, Astrodome Turns 50 as an Eyesore, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE (April 4, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/article/ 
Once-a-symbol-of-ambition-Astrodometurns-50-as-6177697.php. 
18 Matthew Brown, Mark Nagel, Chad McEvoy & David Rascher, Revenue and Wealth Maximization in 
the National Football League: The Impact of Stadia, 13 SPORT MKTG. Q. 227, 227 (2004). 
19 All-Time MLS Attendance, HOUSTON DYNAMO, http://www.houstondynamo.com/history/stats/ 
attendance (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
20 Kevin Delaney & Rick Eckstein, Urban Power Structures and Publicly Financed Stadiums, 22 SOC. 
F. 331, 333 (2007). 
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teams.21 This again appears to support the thesis that the wealthy and pow-
erful have manipulated the issue in their favor. 
There are certainly advocates for the public support of stadiums funded 
by corporate executives. One article suggests that using the “leverage” of 
the team to integrate it into the fabric of life in the community will create a 
value to the community that may not be evident from an economic analy-
sis.22 The authors suggest that it is politically improvident for elected offi-
cials to stop advocating for and providing public support for professional 
teams. Accordingly, looking past or failing to take into account the failed 
economic promises of the team owners is mandated.23 However, this logic 
fades in light of the number of studies that continue to document the pub-
lic’s refusal to vote to provide public financial support for teams.  
II. REVIEW OF SEVERAL RECENT PRO SPORTS STADIUMS 
It is not necessary or useful to review all the publicly supported pro 
sports stadiums since 1990, or even 2000. The authors have selected three 
recent examples of publicly subsidized pro sports stadiums to explore in 
more detail: BBVA Compass Stadium (2012, Houston, TX); Marlins Park 
(2012, Miami, FL); and U.S. Bank Stadium (2016, Minneapolis, MN). 
BBVA Compass Stadium – Houston, Texas – Houston Dynamo (MLS) 
Completed in 2012, public funds financed 37% of the Dynamo’s stadium 
as part of the $95 million price tag.24 Given the international community in 
Houston, the success of soccer is not surprising. What is surprising is that 
the public was pushed to contribute to this stadium when it already had a 
public facility that would have provided a larger seating capacity and led to 
higher ticket sales. As part of the selling of the partial public financing of 
the project to the public at large, an “Impact Report” was presented in 
2013.25 A statement from this report illuminates the approach taken by the 
proponents of such stadium financing deals:                                                               
21 Id. at 347. 
22 Emily Sparvero & Laurence Chalip, Professional Teams as Leverageable Assets: Strategic Creation 
of Community Value, 10 SPORT MGMT. REV. 1, 2-3 (2007). 
23 Id. at 5. 
24 Timothy B. Kellison, Civic Paternalism in Political Policymaking: The Justification for No-Vote Sta-
dium Subsidies and the Public Response 1, 2 tbl. 1.1 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida 
State University) (on file with the Florida State University Libraries). 
25 BBVA Stadium Impact Report, Strategic Development Solutions, (2013), http://www.wave-
landventures.com/pdfs/bbva_compass_stadium_impact_report_1375467777.pdf. 
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“Taxpayers provide the direct subsidies invested in a project via local, 
state or federal government programs, yet taxpayers do not have a direct 
vote on the specific project being funded. An impact report serves to ensure 
continued taxpayer support of such funding efforts by defining a project’s 
community, environmental and economic impacts as well as its financial 
returns.”26 
And yet, objective studies not paid for by the proponents of such stadi-
ums, such as the ones cited above in Part I, indicate that the outcome for the 
public is far less favorable than the stadium advocates promise. The BBVA 
Compass Stadium Impact Report claims that the location was selected for 
the purpose of revitalizing “Houston’s highly-distressed East Downtown 
and adjacent neighborhoods.”27 In fact, much of the new construction in the 
area discussed in the report required the bulldozing of Houston’s vibrant 
“Chinatown.” In the case of the Dynamo stadium, the economic projections 
of a substantial return to the community leave out an important control fac-
tor. The Houston area was already experiencing an unprecedented boom in 
real estate and development, which included the downtown area. An objec-
tive economic analysis would have compared the growth that would have 
taken place without the specific stadium project against the growth that was 
directly attributable to the project. It is important to note that the public 
support for the Dynamo stadium project was not put to a vote by public of-
ficials.28    
In the case of the Dynamo stadium, the public financial participation 
does not seem to have negatively impacted the political future of Houston’s 
mayor during the key funding of the project. Houston, combined with the 
surrounding Harris County, contributed the land, which was reportedly 
worth approximately $15 million at that time, as well as $20 million in “in-
frastructure improvements.”29 City Controller at the time, Anise Parker ran 
for mayor of Houston as the Dynamo stadium was in the final stages of ap-
proval. She was not only elected, but she was reelected twice—leaving only 
due to term limits at the end of 2015. She was obviously not politically 
damaged by her financial support for the new stadium, Marlins Park, Mi-
ami, FL – Miami Marlins (MLB)                                                              
26 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 Sarah Talalay, Marlins Stadium Update No. 100,308, SUN SENTINEL, (Oct. 3, 2008, 5:23 PM), 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sfl-mtblog-2008-10-marlins_stadium_update_no_1003-story.html. 
29Neil deMause, Houston Dynamo Stadium Approved – No, Really This Time, Fɪᴇʟᴅ ᴏꜰ  Sᴄʜᴇᴍᴇꜱ  (Dec. 
6, 2010), http://www.fieldofschemes.com/2010/12/06/2848/houston-dynamo-stadiumapproved-no-
really-this-time/. 
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The campaign and then the substantial public financing for the Miami 
Marlins’ new baseball stadium reads like the pages of a John Grisham nov-
el. The Marlins pushed for a new stadium, so in 2008 the Dade County (FL) 
Commissioners voted to use $347 million in public funds to construct the 
ballpark.30 A former NFL team owner, Norman Braman, subsequently sued 
to prevent the use of public funds to finance the new stadium on the 
grounds that it violated the Florida constitution since the stadium primarily 
benefitted a private entity.31 Braman’s suit failed at the trial court level and 
that decision was upheld on appeal.32 In a coup of circular reasoning, the 
Florida courts ruled that a public purpose was served since a public body 
had determined that it was in the public interest to finance this stadium.33 
This is despite the fact that 100% of the non-baseball revenue would also go 
to the Marlins.34  
Since the Marlins Stadium opened in 2012, the team has reportedly been 
plagued by poor ticket sales.35 The Marlins’ share of the stadium construc-
tion costs was $135 million, but this also included the retention of naming 
rights, which was a valuable perk for the team. Additionally, part of the 
money was to be paid as a modest rent for the facility over the next 20 
years—an amount far below the cost of capital even in today’s world of 
cheap borrowing. As of October 2016,36 the Marlins had been unable to sell 
rights to its stadium name, despite lucrative payments collected by other 
teams such as the Houston Texans, which garnered $300 million over 30 
years for its naming rights.37  
The coup de grâce in the Marlins Park saga may be that in 2013 the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filed suit in Federal District 
Court against the City of Miami and its Budget Director, Michael Bou-
dreaux, for securities fraud in the manipulation of the city’s finances to 
                                                             
30 Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’ Demand for Free Pub-
lic Stadiums, 6 Rᴜᴛɢᴇʀꜱ  J. L. & Pᴜʙ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ 35 (2008). 
31 See Braman v. Miami-Dade County, No. 08-03787-CA-15, 2008 WL 4189770, *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
9, 2008), aff’d, 18 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 28-38. 
34 Edelman, supra note 30, at 45. 
35 Marc Edelman, Will an Empty Marlins Park Create Backlash Against Sports Stadium Subsidies?, 
Fᴏʀʙᴇs (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/02/21/will-an-empty-
marlins-park-create-backlash-against-sports-stadium-subsidies/#4068277f4bdf. 
36 Marlins Park Bᴀʟʟᴘᴀʀᴋs ᴏf Aᴍᴇʀɪᴄᴀ, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/ballparks/marlins-park/ 
(last visited October 30, 12:17 AM). 
37 Edleman, supra note 30, at 46. 
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make it appear more financially stable when selling bonds to the public.38 
Those included bonds to fund the Marlins stadium.39 Recently, the United 
State Supreme Court has been asked to overrule the denial by both the trial 
court and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals of Boudreaux’s motion to dis-
miss him from the case on qualified immunity grounds.40  
The political fallout from the public financial support of the Marlins sta-
dium was much greater than the Dynamo stadium in Houston. Miami-Dade 
Mayor Carlos Alvarez was recalled in an election tied to public outrage 
over the stadium financing in March 2011.41 It does appear that reaction of 
communities to public financing of pro sports stadiums is highly localized. 
U.S. Bank Stadium, Minneapolis, MN – Minnesota Vikings (NFL) 
This stadium is being built on the site of the prior Vikings stadium, and 
has made the MarketWatch list of “5 Cities Getting the Worst Deal from 
Sports Teams.”42 Currently its price tag is in excess of $1 billion.43 To put 
this amount into perspective, NASA’s New Horizons satellite and its ten-
year trip to Pluto cost less than this stadium will.44 The public share of the 
billion-dollar total will be $498 million, with $150 million to be paid by the 
City of Minneapolis and $384 million to be paid by the State of Minneso-
ta.45 In an interesting move, the City’s portion will be paid by “redirecting” 
part of the current convention center taxes, which are being collected.46 The 
State’s share will come from gambling revenues and a one-time cigarette 
inventory tax.47 Examining these sources leads to a key observation: these                                                              
38 S.E.C. v. City of Miami, 581 F. App’x 757, 758 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Boudreaux 
v. S.E.C., (U.S. Mar. 17, 2015) (No. 14-1142). 
39 Douglas Hanks, How a $91 million loan on the Marlins ballpark will cost Miami-Dade $1.2 billion, 
Mɪᴀᴍɪ Hᴇʀᴀʟᴅ, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/economic-time-
machine/article1946635.html.   
40 Boudreaux v. S.E.C., (U.S. Mar. 17, 2015) (No. 14-1142). 
41 Tim Elfrink, Six Lies about the Marlins Stadium, Mɪᴀᴍɪ Nᴇᴡ Tɪᴍᴇs, May 5, 2011, 
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/six-lies-about-the-marlins-stadium-6380692. 
42 Joe Kimball, Vikings Stadium Makes MarketWatch List of ‘Worst Deals from Sports Teams’, 
MɪɴɴPᴏsᴛ, July 17, 2015, https://www.minnpost.com/political-agenda/2015/07/vikings-stadium-makes-
marketwatch-list-worst-deals-sports-teams. 
43 U.S. Bank Stadium, Sᴛᴀᴅɪᴜᴍs ᴏF Pʀᴏ Fᴏᴏᴛʙᴀʟʟ, 
http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/nfc/USBankStadium.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
44 Pat Kessler, Reality Check: Trip to Pluto Cost Less Than Vikings Stadium, CBS Mɪɴɴᴇsᴏᴛᴀ, (July 15, 
2015, 6:39 PM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/07/15/reality-check-trip-to-pluto-costs-less-than-
vikings-stadium/. 
45 U.S. Bᴀɴᴋ Sᴛᴀᴅɪᴜᴍ Cᴏsᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Fɪɴᴀɴᴄɪɴɢ, http://www.vikings.com/stadium/new-
stadium/faq.html#cost (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
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taxes could have been earmarked for healthcare, housing for the poor and 
elderly, and for education instead of financing a new stadium for a privately 
owned team which will be the sole recipient of the profits that are generat-
ed.  
Similar to the suit filed against the Marlins Stadium, a former mayoral 
candidate in Minneapolis filed suit in state court to block the sale of the 
bonds sold to build the new Vikings Stadium.48 Paralleling the outcome in 
Florida, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied the suit to block the public 
bonds’ sale.49 On the positive side, such suits underscore at least some un-
happiness with the public funding approach and help to bring to the public’s 
attention issues related to the financing. This is especially important in “no-
vote” situations like the three stadiums discussed in this part of the article. 
In addition to the lawsuits, groups of citizens against publicly funded stadi-
ums are emerging, and their presence underscores the discontent with how 
the stadiums are funded. The Citizens for Viking Stadium Democracy and 
Justice is a self-described group of “Minneapolis citizens seeking to compel 
the Minneapolis City Council to comply with provisions of the Minneapolis 
City Charter that require a popular referendum to authorize the city’s role in 
financing and funding the new Vikings stadium.”50 When taxpayer money 
is on the table, taxpayers should have a voice.  
While the Vikings will pay more than $500 million in construction costs, 
the team owners will recover their share of the total stadium costs easily.51 
It is projected that the Vikings will receive over $200 million just for the 
naming rights paid by U.S. Bank.52 The Vikings website also reports a pro-
jected income of $125 million from selling “Stadium Builders Licenses,” 
                                                             
48 Janet Moore, Minnesota Supreme Court Asked to Dismiss Vikings Stadium Bond Suit, Sᴛᴀʀ Tʀɪʙᴜɴᴇ 
(Jan. 15, 2014, 9:32 AM), http://www.startribune.com/minn-supreme-court-asked-to-dismiss-vikings-
stadium-bond-suit/239982631/. 
49 Associated Press, Minnesota Supreme Court Dismisses Vikings Stadium Suit, Wᴀꜱ ʜ. Tɪᴍᴇs (Jan. 21, 
2014, 7:58 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/21/minnesota-news-in-brief-at-758-
pm-cst/?page=all.  
50 Citizens for Viking Stadium Democracy and Justice, Fᴀᴄᴇʙᴏᴏᴋ, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Citizens-for-Viking-Stadium-Democracy-and-Justice/ 
409145455868384?sk=info&tab=page_info.  
51 Brian Bakst, Vikings bump stadium share past $500 million, Nᴇᴡꜱ OK (Nov. 22, 2013, 9:16 AM), 
http://newsok.com/vikings-bump-stadium-share-past-500-million/article/feed/620137; Tom Goldstein, 
Vikings stadium proposal isn't for the "people", CITY PAGES (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.citypages.com/news/vikings-stadium-proposal-isnt-for-the-people-6755964. 
52 Nick Halter, U.S. Bank Confirms Naming Rights Deal for New Vikings Stadium, MINN.ST. PAUL BUS. 
J. (June 15, 2015, 4:31 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/blog/sports-business/2015/06/u-s-
bank-pays-220m-for-vikings-stadium-naming.html.  
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which require annual purchase of season tickets in order to maintain the li-
cense.53 
The Minnesota stadium is so large that it requires both state and local 
support. Much like the situation in Houston, the key politicians in Minneso-
ta do not seem to have paid the price for supporting these large public out-
lays. The Governor of Minnesota, Mark Dayton, remains in office. The 
Mayor of Minneapolis during the stadium approval process, R.T. Rybak, 
left office in 2014, deciding not to run after serving for three terms.54  
The No-Vote Trend for Public Financing Support for Pro Sports Stadiums 
Financing proposals calling for substantial public funds impact the tax-
payers in every jurisdiction that permits public financing for pro sports sta-
diums. The three examples above were no-vote situations. Moreover, a dis-
turbing trend since 2000 is for such stadium financing deals to be approved 
by political bodies without a vote by the public.55 In fact, the statistics may 
be stunning to some:  
Since 2005, more than 30 stadium projects representing nearly 90% of all 
stadium development have been allocated over $8.5 billion of public funds 
without any form of voter approval.56 
Frequent authors on sports management issues Timothy Kellison and 
Michael Mondello attribute the political will to approve such expenditures 
to a phenomenon they refer to as “civic paternalism.”57 In short, even if the 
voters disapprove, the politicians think that they know better and the out-
come will justify the disregard of the voters. It would seem that with the 
growing tidal wave of evidence that public subsidies are not justified by ei-
ther economic impact or civic pride, that the no-vote approach should be-
come increasingly unattractive in the United States. Moreover, although 
there is the argument that the voters can always vote their elected officials 
out of office if they disagree with their representatives’ votes, in view of the 
overwhelming evidence noted above indicating the failures of such projects 
to achieve the promised outcomes, the argument of abuse of power by those 
elected officials is becoming more valid and more powerful.                                                              
53 U.S. Bᴀɴᴋ Sᴛᴀᴅɪᴜᴍ Cᴏsᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Fɪɴᴀɴᴄɪɴɢ, supra note 45. 
54 Eric Roper, Rybak authors book about tenure as Mpls. mayor, STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 26, 2015, 5:13 
PM), http://www.startribune.com/rybak-authors-book-about-tenure-as-mpls-mayor/337153251/. 
55 Timothy B. Kellison & Michael Mondello, Civic Paternalism in Political Policymaking: The Justifi-
cation for No- Vote Stadium Subsidies, 28 J. SPORT MGMT. 162, 162 (2014). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 165. 
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III. LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE “ENABLERS” OF PUBLIC PRO SPORTS 
STADIUMS 
 Tax Exempt Bonds 
Traditionally, bonds issued by state and local governmental organiza-
tions are tax exempt and are known collectively as “municipal bonds” or 
“munis.”58 Generally, the yields are lower because public entities are 
viewed as low-risk bond issuers and the purchaser of the bonds would not 
be obligated to pay income tax on the interest.59 The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 changed the rules to allow clearly public purpose bonds to continue to 
be exempt, but defined multiple categories of bonds that would be subject 
to different rules that in some cases will make some or all of the income 
taxable.60 The type of bond relevant to the financing of sports stadiums is a 
“private activity bond.”61 For any exemption at all, at least 95% of the 
funds raised from the sale of bonds must go to the stated purpose for the 
sale of the bonds.62 Persons subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax 
(“AMT”) in particular may find that they are not subject to tax on the bond 
dividend income directly, but the income is included in their gross income 
for purposes of the AMT.63  
Employees own some muni bonds through tax-deferred employee sav-
ings plans. Indeed, some individuals with modest amounts in the investment 
market may own some of these muni bonds. For optimal value, these bonds 
are held by investors in higher tax brackets who own them directly, rather 
than in a tax-deferred plan. Obviously, such bonds are heavily in the realm 
of persons and organizations wealthy enough to purchase bonds and to ben-
efit from their tax advantaged status. The sensitivity to the tax deductibility 
of tax-exempt private activity bonds was illustrated following the enactment 
of the 1986 Act. The volume of munis dropped 75% from 1985 to 1986.64 
When the governmental organizations sell bonds, the interest of course be-                                                             
58 William C. Spaulding, Municipal Government Bonds, THIS MATTER, 
http://thismatter.com/money/bonds/types/government/municipal-bonds.htm (last visited June 28, 2015). 
59 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MUNICIPAL BONDS, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/basics/investment-products/municipal-bonds. 
60 Spaulding, supra note 58. 
61 See Tax-Exempt Private Activity Bonds, I.R.S. Pub. 4078 (Rev. 9-2005), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p4078.pdf. (last visited June 28, 2015). 
62 26 U.S.C. § 142 (2016). 
63 See Spaulding, supra note 58. 
64 Gerald Auten & Edward Chung, Private Activity Tax-Exempt Bonds, Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀʟ Rᴇᴠᴇɴᴜᴇ Sᴇʀᴠ., 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/86ebprac.pdf (last visited June 29, 2015). 
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comes the responsibility of the public. No matter what is said in public, the 
reality is that generally all of the resources of the government agency that 
issued the bonds are dedicated to paying that interest and ultimately retiring 
the bonds. This is especially true since The Tax Reform Act of 1986 re-
quired that only 10% of the funds used to pay off tax-exempt private activi-
ty bonds for stadiums or convention centers may come from ticket sales and 
concessions.65 This would appear to limit the use of such bonds. However, 
if the public agencies issuing these bonds use tax proceeds from other 
sources, for instance, a hotel tax, then such revenue can be used to make up 
the difference without making the bonds taxable. To estimate the magnitude 
of the tax subsidy:  
Tax exemptions on interest paid by muni bonds that were issued for 
sports structures cost the U.S. Treasury $146 million a year, based on data 
compiled by Bloomberg on 2,700 securities. Over the life of the $17 billion 
of exempt debt issued to build stadiums since 1986, the last of which ma-
tures in 2047, taxpayer subsidies to bondholders will total $4 billion, the da-
ta show.66 
Despite the promoters’ statements to the contrary, the reality is that the 
stadiums tend to benefit the wealthy—those wealthy enough to buy the tax 
advantaged bonds, buy the tickets and luxury box seats at the new stadiums, 
and of course, largely for the super-rich, own the teams as well. In a recent 
display of wealth and excess, Steve Balmer, former CEO of Microsoft, paid 
$2 billion for the Los Angeles Clippers of the National Basketball Associa-
tion (“NBA”).67 Ironically, this massive price tag did not include a stadium, 
since the Clippers play at the Staples Center in Los Angeles, a privately 
owned venue. The Staples Center is host to four major sports teams, the 
Lakers and the Clippers of the NBA, the Los Angeles Kings of the National 
Hockey League (“NHL”), and the Women’s National Basketball 
(“WNBA”) team the Los Angeles Sparks.68 This fact adds new force to the 
question as to why pro teams each need to have their own stadiums and 
why any type of “public welfare” should be provided. In fact, this approach                                                              
65 See Aaron Kuriloff & Darrell Preston, In Stadium Building Spree, U.S. Taxpayers Lose $4 Billion, 
Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ Bᴜꜱ . (Sept. 4, 2012, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-05/in-
stadium-building-spree-u-s- taxpayers-lose-4-billion. 
66 Id. 
67 ESPN News Services, Steve Ballmer New Clippers Owner, ESPN (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/11343259/steve-ballmer-officially-new-owner-los-
angeles-clippers. 
68 About Staples Center, STAPLES CTR., http://www.staplescenter.com/about/about-staples-center (last 
visited June 25, 2015).  
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turns the allegedly progressive United States income tax system on its head 
by advantaging the wealthy at the expense of the lower and middle-income 
taxpayers.69 
 Use of Public Condemnation Power to Build Stadiums for Private Benefit 
 In addition to raising the money to build new sports stadiums, the real 
estate on which the stadiums are located also needs to be acquired. Parallel 
to the use of public dollars to finance construction, is the use of the public 
power of eminent domain to acquire the property. Traditionally, the power 
of eminent domain has been only invoked, as delimited by the 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, to acquire private property 
for a public purpose. The Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of 
New London, 70 however, turned this legal mandate on its head and permit-
ted the City of New London, Connecticut, to use eminent domain for a sole-
ly economic taking. As noted above, eminent domain has been used primar-
ily to justify the taking of private property for many public purposes, 
including: revitalizing blighted regions,71 reorganizing housing markets,72 
and reinvigorating sluggish economies, but all of the purposes have been 
within a public realm.73 Kelo addressed the “important question of when 
eminent domain may constitutionally be used to take property for projects 
that are not publicly owned and operated facilities.”74 Justice Stevens, in 
writing the majority decision, notes that the taking at issue in Kelo served a 
public purpose, satisfying the interpretation dictated by precedent, which 
were increased tax revenues, reduced unemployment, and other expected 
companion benefits to collectively benefit the public. By the Court’s rea-
soning, such benefits allow the Kelo taking to be categorized as serving a 
“public purpose.”75 Ironically, as noted above, these are the identical argu-
ments put forth to justify spending public money to construct private sports 
stadiums.                                                              
69 Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massoron Ross, Introduction to EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND 
ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT, at xvii (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massoron eds., American Bar As-
sociation 2006). 
70 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
71 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954). 
72 See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984). 
73 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
74 Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massoron Ross, Introduction to EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: 
KELO IN CONTEXT, at xvii (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massoron eds., American Bar Association 
2006). 
75 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. 
14
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/6 5
Schein et al.: American Cities Held Hostag : Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Fran
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017
 AMERICAN CITIES HELD HOSTAGE 77 
 
In his dissent to the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision regarding 
Kelo prior to its appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice 
Zarella summarized the effect of Kelo: 
[This] expansive interpretation [...] represents a sea change in the evolu-
tion of the law of takings because it blurs the distinction between public 
purpose and private benefit and [...] raise[s] the specter that the power will 
be used by government to favor purely private interests.76 
Furthermore, the majority acknowledged, “The government’s pursuit of a 
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties,”77 but conclud-
ed there exists “no basis for exempting economic development from our 
traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”78 
The public outcry following the Kelo decision was expressed largely in 
articles from sources such as The Economist, which ran a column contain-
ing the language “Americans used to believe that their constitution protect-
ed private property,”79 as well as various law review publications, including 
the Harvard Environmental Law Review, which wrote that “the Supreme 
Court has left homeowners in a state of uncertainty.”80 Such articles seem 
to have been written with the goal of leaving the reader expecting “men 
with bulldozers”81 within days. Of course, the actual path of development 
has been different than predicted due to the cacophonous response to the 
Kelo ruling. While Kelo serves to remedy potential “hold-out” problems in 
redevelopment scenarios, it opens the door to under-compensation for those 
whose property is taken without consent.82  
As of October 2016, three hundred and nine cases have cited Kelo, one 
hundred and eighty-five of these cases have been federal cases.83 Of those 
decisions, three were Supreme Court cases. None of the three Supreme 
Court cases cited Kelo in the majority opinion, only in concurring or dis-                                                             
76 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 575 (2004) (Zarella, J., dissenting), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005). 
77 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485. 
78 Id. 
79 Hands Off Our Homes: Property Rights and Eminent Domain, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 
71 (emphasis added). 
80 Eric Rutkow, Note, Kelo v. City of New London, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 279 (2006). 
81 See id. 
82 See Richard Posner, The Kelo Case, Public Use, and Eminent Domain, THE BECKER-POSNER 
BLOG (June 20, 2005, 9:09 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/06/the-kelo-case-public-
use-and-eminent-domain--posner-comment.html. 
83 LexisNexis Shepardization of Kelo v. City of New London, https://advance.lexis.com (follow “Shep-
ardize this document” hyperlink from Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
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senting opinions.84 Three state court cases criticized the decision,85 but 
none thus far have declined to follow Kelo. Given the substantial preceden-
tial value of Supreme Court rulings, the judiciary’s failure to criticize Kelo 
is not particularly startling.86  
However, state courts have much more leeway when they are interpret-
ing their own constitutions. Of the decisions that distinguished themselves 
from Kelo, two stand out by virtue of their analysis contrasting Kelo with 
their respective issues. The first, Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Cano Martin 
Pena v. Fortuno, focused on the plaintiff’s claim that if title to their lands 
were transferred to public agencies, “those agencies could not be trusted to 
carry out the public purposes”87 required by Law 489, and transfer the title 
of public lands to the plaintiff.88 It was argued that the transfer of lands 
back to public agencies did not meet the public use requirement of 
the Takings Clause.89 The court held: 
Irrespective of whether the Fideicomiso is, as it claims, a private owner 
of lands considered private property under Puerto Rican law, it cannot ob-
tain the relief it seeks if its “public use” argument fails. Unlike the ancillary 
questions identified by the district court, this is a question of federal consti-
tutional law. Because the Fideicomiso cannot prevail on its argument that 
Law is not for “public use,” as discussed below, abstention is unwarrant-
ed.90          
The second case, which deserves mention, is Rumber v. District of Co-
lumbia.91 The issue in Rumber was the District of Columbia’s exercise of 
its eminent domain power over plaintiff's property.92 Plaintiff property 
owners “contend that the defendants are unauthorized to exercise eminent 
domain and that the plaintiffs will be injured if and when the defendants ex-
ercise eminent domain over their properties.”93                                                               
84 See, e.g., Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 556 U.S. 729, 752 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
85 Planned Indus. Expansion Auth. of Kan. City v. Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, 316 S.W.3d 418, 
426 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1122 (Ohio 2006); In re A 
Permanent Right-Of-Way, 2014 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 239, *16 (Pa. County Ct. 2014). 
86 Elisabeth Sperow, Perspective on Kelo v. City of New London: The Kelo Legacy: Political Account-
ability, Not Legislation, Is the Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 425–26 (2007). 
87 Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Cano Martin Pena v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 7 (1st Cir. 2010). 
88 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23 § 5048. 
89 Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Cano Martin Pena v. Fortuno, 604 F.3d 7, 77 (1st Cir. 2010). 
90 Id. 
91 Rumber v. District of Columbia, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16935, at *1-2, (D.D.C. July 19, 2005). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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The question presented in Kelo was “whether the city’s proposed disposi-
tion of [that] property [for the purpose of economic revitalization,] qualifies 
as a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.” [...] The Supreme Court, relying on the 
Berman case [...] reaffirmed that “transforming a blighted area into a ‘well-
balanced’ community through redevelopment” is a legitimate public use 
under the Fifth Amendment.94  
The plaintiffs argued in Rumber that Kelo forbids the type of purpose of 
eminent domain powers proposed by the District of Columbia, since private 
parties are being used to accomplish the taking and revitalization, but the 
“one-to-one transfer admonished in Kelo is not present in this case.”95 The 
property in contention was clearly in a blighted area and as the Supreme 
Court said again in Kelo, “community redevelopment programs need not, 
by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building 
by building.”96 
At the same time, individual states may adopt eminent domain statues 
that differ from the federal government’s prescribed definition of eminent 
domain, so long as the state laws remain consistent with the minimal re-
quirement of the federal standard. Scores of states have exercised this right 
in direct reaction to the Kelo holding. 
All but six states (New York, Hawaii, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Okla-
homa, and Arkansas) have enacted some form of legislation that either in-
creases that state’s citizens’ protection against eminent domain takings or 
substantially reforms the state’s eminent domain clause.97 Of those states 
that have passed Kelo-responsive legislation, their responses may be cate-
gorized into “five major categories of reactive legislation: (1) Authorization 
for public use; (2) restriction of use to blighted properties; (3) enhanced 
public notice, hearing, and negotiation criteria; (4) local government ap-
proval; and (5) prohibiting eminent domain for specific purposes,”98 such as 
economic development, to increase tax revenue or employment, or to trans-
fer property to another private entity. 
                                                             
94 Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted). 
95 Id. at *12. 
96 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954). 
97 See Enacted Legislative Action Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/enacted 
legislation-since-kelo (last visited June 28, 2015).  
98 Randy J. Bates, II, What’s the Use? The Court Takes a Stance on the Public Use Doctrine in Kelo v. 
City of New London, 57 MERCER L. REV. 689, 711–12 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
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STATE RESPONSES BY CATEGORY 
Category Number of States States 
Prohibiting Eminent 
Domain for Specific 
Purposes 
23 
AL, AK, AZ, CO, 
FL, GA, ID, IL, KS, 
LA, ME, MI, MO, NE, 
NH, NM, OR, SD, TN, 
TX, VT, WV, WI 
Authorization for 
Public Use 12 
AZ, DE, GA, IN, 
IA, MN, NV, NC, ND, 
SC, VA, WY 
Restriction of Use to 
Blighted Properties 
 
13 
AL, FL, GA, IA, IL, 
IN, KS, MT, NC, PA, 
SC, WV, WI 
Enhanced public no-
tice, hearing, and negoti-
ation criteria 
8 CT, GA, IA, MN, MO, RI, UT, WV 
Local Government 
Approval 4 CT, IN, MI, RI 
 
In view of the number of states that enacted legislation in the aftermath 
of Kelo, it is clear that the Kelo decision got the attention of lawmakers 
across the country who took issue with the holding in the case and took the 
steps to ameliorate its impact. 
State Supreme Courts across the country were also swift in their response 
to Kelo. Just over a year after Kelo, the Ohio Supreme Court decided City of 
Norwood v. Horney.99 In Horney, the city, which was suffering financially, 
agreed to transfer property to a development company redeveloping an area 
of the city.100 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court and the ap-
pellate court erred in finding that the appropriation of the owners’ property 
was permitted.101 The trial court had properly found an abuse of discretion                                                              
99 City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006). 
100 Id. at 1124. 
101 Id. at 1142. 
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in the City’s finding that the area targeted for redevelopment was a slum, 
blighted, or deteriorated.102 However, the Supreme Court found that the tri-
al court had erred in finding that judicial review of condemnations was lim-
ited and had to be deferential to the municipality.103 Because the city could 
not justify its taking of the property on either the basis that the neighbor-
hood was deteriorating, or on the basis that the redeveloped area would 
bring economic value to the city, there was no showing that the taking was 
for public use.104 As a matter of Ohio law, any taking based solely on fi-
nancial gain is void.105 
The South Dakota judiciary placed even tighter reins on the state’s emi-
nent domain power than suggested by either Kelo or Ohio law. In Benson v. 
State, South Dakota’s Supreme Court firmly stated that Article VI, Section 
13 of South Dakota’s Constitution “provides its landowners more protection 
against a taking of their property than the United States Constitution.”106 
The court contrasted its reading of the South Dakota Constitution with the 
interpretation of the United States Constitution utilized by the Kelo court.107 
The South Dakota Court reaffirmed that its “use by the public” test, which 
“requires that there be a ‘use or right of use on the part of the public or 
some limited portion of it,’”108 “continues to be the law of this jurisdic-
tion.”109 Overall, South Dakota has substantially limited its eminent domain 
power after Kelo. 
Other states, like Minnesota, which have had judicial responses to Kelo, 
while still constraining eminent domain power, are lukewarm by compari-
son to the states mentioned above. In Eagan Economic Development Au-
thority v. U-Haul Co. of Minnesota, the Supreme Court of Minnesota ad-
dressed the legality of a “quicktake” condemnation by the Eagan Economic 
Development Authority (“EDA”).110 The Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that the applicable Redevelopment Plan was binding on the EDA and did 
                                                             
102 Id. at 1136. 
103 Id. 
104 City of Norwood, 853 N.E.2d 1115 at 1124, 1136. 
105 Id. at 1142 (Ohio 2006) (holding that Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution voids any taking 
based solely on an economic or financial benefit). 
106 Benson v. State of South Dakota, 710 N.W.2d 131, 146 (S.D. 2006). 
107 See id. (discussing that South Dakota has consistently imposed “public use” requirements that are 
stricter than the federal baseline adopted by the Kelo court). 
108 Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. E. Sioux Falls Quarry Co., 144 N.W. 724 (1913)). 
109 Id. 
110 Eagan Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Uhaul of Minn., 787 N.W.2d 523, 525 (Minn. 2010). 
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not require the condemning authority to have a formal development agree-
ment before condemning private property.111 
Nevertheless, the state legislatures and their judiciaries continue to find 
ways, roundabout ways, to constrict the scope of application of Kelo. For 
example, in State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan112 anti-Kelo legislation shelter-
ing under the Missouri state constitution was upheld by the Supreme Court 
of Missouri, en banc, thus giving it full precedential authority in Missouri 
and almost certainly preventing disruption by federal case law. While rec-
ognizing that Kelo authorizes the use of the Fifth Amendment takings 
clause to take private property for economic development, and without any 
contrary interpretation of the Missouri takings clause, which is worded very 
similarly, the court found that 
 [t]he legislature, which is the branch of government elected to determine 
public policy, made the policy decision to enact §523.271 to rein in the 
“public use” of economic development approved in Kelo. The statute pro-
hibits the use of eminent domain for solely economic development purposes 
in Missouri.113   
The court goes on to do very close analysis of the exact wording of the 
statute, and also to lay out the statute’s definition of “economic develop-
ment”:   
Under the statute, economic development is defined as ‘use of a specific 
piece of property or properties which would provide an increase in the tax 
base, tax revenues, employment, and general economic health.114 
 Although the court provides some fairly big loopholes for developers 
and their friends in municipal entities to try to take advantage of in future 
cases, in this instance it concludes that since the Authority that wanted to 
take the Trust’s private property had only [“solely”] economic development 
as its justification, it was prohibited from taking the property.115 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, held that a 
municipal authority could not “exercise its eminent domain powers to con-
demn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the                                                              
111 Id. at 539. 
112 See State et al. v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 482-83 (Mo. 2013) (holding that the Port Authority’s tak-
ing is “for solely economic purposes” and therefore violates Missouri law). 
113 Id. at 478. 
114 Id. at 479. 
115 See id. at 482-83 (“[E]conomic development may not be the sole purpose of a taking” therefore 
“[t]he Port Authority failed to demonstrate a purpose that was in addition to economic development.”). 
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easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage 
facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision.”116 
While the court does carefully criticize Kelo, ultimately it decides that 
legislation subsequent to Kelo, 26 Pa.C.S. §204(a), constituted a prohibition 
of public taking of private property for use by private enterprise.117 In 
Pennsylvania, even if the taking confers a public benefit, if it is going to be 
used for private enterprise, it is prohibited. Here, where the use of an ease-
ment acquired via a public taking would BE a private developer’s develop-
ment of a residential subdivision, the taking falls within the post-Kelo legis-
lative prohibition. 
Also in 2014, the Georgia Supreme Court in Darling International, Inc. 
v. Carter et al.118 laid out the amendments to the Georgia Constitution and 
the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act. The 
court noted that as of 2006, in Georgia, “the public benefit of economic de-
velopment with respect to authority for exercising the power of eminent 
domain”119 is no longer justification for the taking of private property. Sad-
ly for the original Plaintiff, however, the court found that the particular tak-
ing in this case occurred before the new legislation went into effect, and 
was therefore valid under Kelo.120 
These cases can be seen as part of a slow-motion backlash against Kelo, 
and they indicate that states wishing to close the Kelo window can fairly 
easily do so, although they must parse very carefully the actual language 
they put in their statutory enactments.   
While it is still in many states quite possible for a sports team or munici-
pality to acquire the real estate on which to build a sports stadium by emi-
nent domain, as evidenced by the Kelo decision, the majority of stadiums 
reviewed for this article were primarily purchased by the entity constructing 
the stadium. 
 The Traditional Anti-Trust Exemption of Pro Sports and Court Rulings 
The premise behind anti-trust laws in the United States is to create a 
more level playing field for businesses and organizations in order to pro-                                                             
116 Reading Area Water Auth. v. Schuylkill River Greenway Ass’n, 100 A.3d 572, 573-584 (Pa. 2014). 
117 Id. at 575. 
118 Darling Int’l Inc. v. Carter, 754 S.E.2d 347, 349-354 (Ga. 2014). 
119 Id. at 354. 
120 Id. at 354-355. 
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mote fair trade and fair competition.121 A key requirement of federal anti-
trust law application is the presence of interstate commerce.122 Considering 
the multi-state schedules of pro sports teams and the mass marketing of 
team paraphernalia, most professional teams easily meet this requirement 
and therefore should be fully subject to the anti-trust laws. There is one no-
table exception: Major League Baseball. In 1922, the Supreme Court held 
that baseball did not involve interstate commerce, providing the league with 
a longstanding, substantial exemption from anti-trust regulations.123 This 
precedent has been called into doubt,124 disagreed with,125 or followed with 
reservations;126 as many jurisdictions see the exemption for what it is: an 
aberration. 
“Major League Baseball is a collective monopoly, with nearly complete 
control over where teams locate. It is difficult to fight back against a mo-
nopoly — even if you are a public municipality.”127 Currently, baseball’s 
anti-trust exemption serves as a legal enabler that allows professional sports 
teams to demand new and often single-sport stadiums with in many cases 
substantial public subsidies.128 Professional sports leagues are typically 
covered by the same anti-trust notions as other businesses, but with a 
unique application because of the uniqueness of the industry. The leagues 
require competition on the field, but cooperation for things such as schedul-
ing and intellectual property licensing.129 For example, where the act of di-
viding markets is typically per se illegal, the court will look at this act under 
the rule of reason for professional sports teams.130 The practical effect has 
been that the other major pro sports teams enjoy a nearly de facto MLB lev-
el of exemption from the anti-trust laws when the “rule of reason” is applied 
to various challenges that have been raised in the courts over the years.                                                               
121 117 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Prosecution or Defense of Antitrust Actions Relating to College 
or Professional Sports § 6 (2010). 
122 Id. at § 4. 
123 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof. Baseball Clubs 259 U.S. 200, 209 
(1922). 
124 Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994) (holding an-
titrust exemption did not extend to sale and location of baseball franchises). 
125 Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 56 F.Supp.3d 280, 295 (S.D.N.Y.) (explaining antitrust exemp-
tion did not apply to territorial broadcasting restrictions). 
126 Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003). 
127 Edelman, supra note 30. 
128 Id. 
129 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 121, at 9. 
130 See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Com’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
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Defenders of baseball’s anti-trust exemption contend that removing the 
anti-trust exemption will not fix the current problem surrounding MLB 
sports teams and publicly funded stadiums.131 They argue that exposing the 
league to anti-trust regulations will have no greater impact on the demands 
placed upon the public for tax subsidies than the league’s current self-
imposed regulations. Other sports leagues continue to demand subsidies 
from cities for stadiums, and anti-trust laws are ineffective in protecting the 
public from this economic harm.132 Upholding an exemption that keeps the 
MLB unreachable from anti-trust law will not alleviate the issues that critics 
use as justification for the exception.  
The issue involving the other major sports is more complex. Without a 
specific Congressional exemption, the other major sports have managed to 
be deemed not in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.133 
Law Professor Jessie Markham explains that judges traditionally have used 
two approaches to evaluate anti-trust claims under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act. First, a per se approach. This was used when a blatant anti-
competitive act occurred and there was little need for further analysis. The 
second approach was the “rule of reason” approach where the defendants 
were given a great deal more leeway to explain the actions they had taken. 
The rule of reason, by its very nature, is a flexible, some might call it a 
“vague” standard.134 Markham argues that the situation has become more 
difficult to interpret as judges are finding fewer cases meet the per se stand-
ard, thereby inviting a less structured analysis under the rule of reason. As 
more cases are being decided under such vague standards, Markham and 
others allege that there is no real standard that leads to inconsistent rulings 
across the United States.135 It is under these conditions that the other major 
sports teams have been able to enjoy monopoly markets even without the 
specific exemption afforded to MLB.  
 Media Blackouts and Pro Sports Teams  
Further evidence of the monopoly power of pro sports are the blackout 
rules that prevent fans of their local teams from watching games played in 
their Home Television Territory (“H.T.T.”), unless they have purchased                                                              
131 Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 211, 219 (2012). 
132 Id. 
133 Paul D. Staudohar, The Scope of Pro Football’s Antitrust Exemption, 50 LAB. L.J. 34, 36 (1999). 
134 Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust 
Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 594 (2012). 
135 Id. 
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special broadcast packages at additional cost. These packages often include 
far more games than the fan might want to purchase, but the packages are 
the only way to access the local games the fan might be seeking. This was 
illustrated in the Laumann case,136 and the parallel case involving Major 
League Baseball, the Garber case.137 As discussed above in this section, the 
historical anti-trust exemption for pro sports, especially for MLB, is still 
largely enforced and still impacting many aspects of team behavior. How-
ever, it does appear to be having a rougher time in the courts lately as it re-
lates to blackouts, as the class action settlements in the Laumann and Gar-
ber cases illustrate.138  
In fact, such exclusive broadcasting agreements protecting the H.T.T. of 
various pro teams were specifically authorized by the Sports Broadcasting 
Act of 1961, and referenced in the Laumann and Garber cases.139 This gift 
to the four pro sports listed in the Act, football, baseball, basketball and 
hockey, was courtesy of the United States Congress. This was characterized 
as an exception to the anti-trust laws.140 The Act can be interpreted to spe-
cifically allow the type of blackout policies that have been the bane of fans 
for years.141 The Act does contain a provision that this media exemption 
does not extend the anti-trust exemption beyond such media agreements.142 
Although, the impact of this provision seems minimal in light of the aggres-
sive and anti-competitive activities of pro teams discussed herein. 
An article describing the situation of three football playoff games during 
January 2014 where local fans would not be able to watch the games on tel-
evision due to the blackout rules referenced above labeled the blackout situ-
ation as “stupid.”143 Logically, the blackout rules serve to protect home 
game attendance. Fans cannot watch the game on local television, so they 
are compelled to go to the team’s home stadium to watch the game. How-                                                             
136 See Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 286-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
137 Garber v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
138See Jeff Zalesin, MLB Fans Get Initial OK for TV Antitrust Settlement, LAW 360 (Jan. 25, 2016, 8:40 
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/750519 (detailing the results of the MLB antitrust settlement in 
Garber). See also, Max Stendahl, NHL Settlement Approved in Broadcast Antitrust Case, LAW 360 
(Sept. 1, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/697822 (discussing the NHL antitrust deal in 
Laumann). 
139 See Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y.). See Garber, 120 F. Supp 3d 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y). 
140 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
141 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
142 15 U.S.C. § 1294 (2012). 
143 Brad Tuttle, Why Millions of NFL Fans Might Not Be Able to Watch Their Team’s Playoff Games, 
Time (Jan. 2, 2014), http://business.time.com/2014/01/02/why-millions-of-nfl-fans-might-not-be-able-
to-watch-their-teamsplayoff-games/. 
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ever, for a large variety of reasons, including high ticket prices and travel-
ing to the location from outlying areas of the many large American 
metroplexes, many fans cannot attend live games. In fact, the system of 
blackouts serves a dual purpose for pro sports teams of driving up ticket 
prices, since the fans cannot watch the games live on television, and at the 
same time, driving up the price of sports cable contracts, which in turn is 
passed along to the fans.  
 Competition and Teams Changing Markets 
One factor that is often mentioned with regard to teams leaving or threat-
ening to leave their current location is that the city failed to provide a heavi-
ly subsidized public sports stadium. However, a closer examination of pro 
sports teams that have moved since 2000 present a different dimension to 
the story. Most of the teams moved because they were not able to make a 
profit in their previous markets. This is consistent with basic capitalism. 
Businesses are not required to stay put into financial obsolescence if they 
can find another location where they can be profitable. Teams that moved 
for reportedly financial reasons include the NBA’s Vancouver Grizzlies to 
Memphis in 2001; the NBA’s Charlotte Hornets to New Orleans in 2002; 
MLB’s Montreal Expos to Washington, D.C. in 2005; and the NHL’s At-
lanta Thrashers moved to Canada and became the Winnipeg Jets in 2011. 
The Vancouver Grizzlies’ owner faced losses reportedly as high as $40 
million in a season.144 This appears to be one of the less controversial relo-
cations of a pro team. The Charlotte Hornets went from a strong position to 
a weak one with annual loses reported to be in the $15 million to $20 mil-
lion range. However, the timing is a bit suspicious given that the relocation 
followed a public vote that turned down financing a new facility in Char-
lotte. New Orleans offered $10 million in relocation costs and promised 
more money from the City’s hotel tax.145 As noted elsewhere in this article, 
a concern here is that public funds often promised to help the needy are be-
ing hijacked for what appear to be private interests. 
Montreal’s team had suffered so long that MLB was considering closing 
the franchise altogether. Although the move itself was not controversial due 
to the losses sustained in Montreal, Washington pledged $400 million to                                                              
144 David Williams, Making Tracks: Remembering How the Grizzlies Moved from Vancouver to Mem-
phis, COM APPEAL (Apr. 26, 2014, 9:36 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/making-tracks-
remembering-howgrizzlies-moved-vanc. 
145 Mary Foster, Owners Approve Hornets’ Move to New Orleans, USA TODAY (May 10, 2002, 8:48 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/nba/hornets/2002-05-10-owners-relocation.htm. 
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build a new stadium.146 The promise of public money did not so much lure 
the Montreal team away from its home city, as it did to help Washington 
win out in a competition with other cities that bid for the team.147 Such a 
use of public funds in a city with significant poverty and financial woes 
raises legitimate questions of priorities. Note that some miles away along 
the Washington Beltway stands the privately owned stadium of the Wash-
ington Redskins.  
In another move that was based on financial hardship, the Atlanta 
Thrashers moved to Winnipeg, Canada. The team had struggled for attend-
ance in Atlanta and no local group came forward to buy the team.148 This 
type of relocation should not invoke a rationale for building public stadiums 
in light of the reasons behind the moves.  
Some teams move for reasons of opportunity, and in some cases, reaction 
to a refusal to fund the team owners’ demands for a public stadium in their 
home location. The refusal of the state of Washington to raise $500 million 
to build a new basketball stadium is implicated in the Seattle Supersonics’ 
move to Oklahoma City in 2007. The relocation did not go smoothly and 
lawsuits were filed to prevent the relocation of the team149. However, Okla-
homa City voters had approved $120 million in public tax incentives to help 
lure the team and close the deal. Subsequently, Forbes reported that the 
team’s value has increased steadily.150 So, it can be argued that a lack of 
municipal support caused the loss of the Sonics, and the offer of such sup-
port helped Oklahoma City land the team. However, another observation is 
that even without public support, the team would have been moved to in-
crease its value.  
In a recent move that is at least in the direction of free enterprise, the 
New Jersey Nets relocated to Brooklyn, New York, in 2012. The team be-
came the Brooklyn Nets and plays in the privately owned Barclays Stadi-
um, following a change of ownership of the team. The move was not with-                                                             
146 Hal Bodley, Selig Confirms Expos’ Move, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2004), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/nl/expos/2004-09-29-washington-move_x.htm. 
147 Id. 
148 ESPN News Services, Thrashers Headed to Winnipeg, ESPN (June 1, 2011), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=6610414. 
149 See Basketball Club of Seattle LLC v. Prof. Basketball Club LLC, No. 2:08-cv-00623 (W.D. Wash. 
filed Apr. 21, 2008); and City of Seattle v. Prof. Basketball Club LLC, No. 2:07-cv-01620 (W.D. Wash. 
filed Oct. 9, 2007). 
150 Christopher Helman, The Sordid Deal That Created the Okla. City Thunder, FORBES, June 13, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/06/13/the-sordid-story-of-how-aubrey-mcclendon-
and-palstransformed-the-seattle-sonics-into-the-oklahoma-city-thunder.  
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out controversy since eminent domain was used to obtain some of the land 
for the development that includes the team’s home in Barclays Stadium.151 
 Winners and Losers 
A fascinating situation continues to develop in California. Los Angeles 
(“L.A.”), America’s second largest city, does not have a pro football team. 
Years ago, the Raiders left for Oakland, California, and the Rams left for St. 
Louis, Missouri. Since that time, various efforts have been made to bring a 
pro football team to that area. At the end of 2015, there were two competing 
proposals for construction of a stadium in the L.A. area. The “Carson City” 
proposal was valued at $1.7 billion and reportedly would be privately fi-
nanced.152 It was claimed by the proponents of this option that both the 
Oakland Raiders and the San Diego Chargers would come to play in this 
new stadium.153 The second proposal is the “Inglewood” plan, which is re-
portedly worth $1.8 billion and also privately financed. The key proponent 
of the Inglewood plan is Stan Kroenke, the owners of the St. Louis Rams. 
Obviously, this presented the likelihood of the Rams returning to Los Ange-
les if the Inglewood plan was adopted.154 The cities of St. Louis and San 
Diego were both under extreme pressure to commit to new stadium deals in 
an effort to prevent their teams from leaving. The city of St. Louis had been 
considering a proposal to build a downtown stadium estimated to cost about 
$985 million to help keep the Rams there.155 The Chargers’ attempt to gain 
a new stadium in the San Diego area has hit many obstacles since 2003. In 
general, most plans involved the public giving the team land. Then, the 
team would develop the land for residential and commercial use, subse-
quently using those proceeds to finance the construction of a new privately 
                                                             
151 Harvey Araton, Nets, After a String of Homes, Hope to Settle into Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/sports/basketball/nets-move-to-brooklyn-with-legitimacy-in-
sight.html? r=0; See also discussion infra regarding use of eminent domain for private purposes. 
152 Tim Logan & Nathan Fenno, Carson City Council Gives Unanimous Approval to NFL Stadium, L.A. 
Times, Apr. 15, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-stadium-carson-20150422-story.html. 
153 Gene Cubbison & Andie Adams, Carson Council Approves Bolts-Raiders Stadium Efforts, NBC 
SAN DIEGO, Apr. 22, 2015, http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Carson-Council-Set-to-Kick-Off-
Bolts-Raiders-Stadium-Efforts-300864591.html#ixzz3a53NIdVC. 
154 Tim Logan & Nathan Fenno, Carson City Council Gives Unanimous Approval to NFL Stadium, CAP. 
GAZETTE, Apr. 21, 2015, http://www.capitalgazette.com/la-sp-nfl-stadium-carson-20150422-story.html. 
155 David Hunn, 9 St. Louis Aldermen Call for Public Vote on New Football Stadium, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, May 15, 2015, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/st-louis-aldermen-call-
for-publicvote-on-new-football/article_0d7f93c5-6d62-5eb8-8236-b25fdf7c9482.html.  
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owned stadium. To date, the San Diego plan has not been successful, so the 
Chargers are clearly open to a proposal from the L.A. area.156  
In January 2016, the NFL owners declined the Carson City plan and ap-
proved the move of the Rams to the L.A. area as proposed by Kroenke.157 
The mayor of St. Louis commented that “The NFL ignored the facts, the 
loyalty of St. Louis fans who supported the team through far more downs 
than ups, and the NFL ignored a strong market and viable plan for a new 
stadium.”158 However, the statement of NFL Commission Roger Goodell 
may have more relevance to the subject of sport-extortion:  
[Relocation is] painful for the fans, the communities, the teams, for the league 
in general. Stability is something that we've taken a great deal of pride in and in 
some ways a bittersweet moment because we were unsuccessful in being able 
to get the kind of facilities that we wanted to get done in their home mar-
kets.159  
This statement by Goodell stands as a threat to other cities that if the 
NFL team owners do not get exactly what they want and quickly, they can 
expect the team to move. It certainly appears as if St. Louis tried to keep the 
team. The New York Times reported: “In St. Louis, a group led by Missouri 
Gov. Jay Nixon has proposed building a $1.1 billion stadium, 40 percent of 
which would be paid for with public money.”160 Similar to the stadiums re-
viewed in Section II, above, the state court sided with the stadium propo-
nents. Missouri Circuit Court Judge Frawley ruled that the St. Louis ordi-
nance requiring a public vote on the stadium was invalid and further, that 
another ordinance requiring that the stadium be adjacent to the city’s con-
vention center was not an impediment since the proposed stadium would be 
in the general area of the convention center.161   
                                                             
156 David Garrick, Past Failures Key to Chargers’ L.A. Pitch, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., June 27, 
2015, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/jun/27/chargers-stadium-nfl-pitch-unsuccessful-
attempts/4/?st#articlecopy. 
157 Rams Headed Back to Los Angeles; Chargers Have Option to Join, ESPN.com, Jan. 13, 2016, 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14558668/st-louis-rams-relocate-los-angeles. 
158 Dan Hanzus, Around the NFL, NFL.COM, Jan. 12, 2016, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap- 
3000000-621645/article/rams-to-relocate-to-la-chargers-first-option-to-join. 
159 Id. 
160 Ken Belson, A Primer on the N.F.L. Relocating a Team to Los Angeles, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/sports/football/nfl-los-angeles-relocation-vote-oakland-san-diego-
st-louis.html. 
161 Order and Judgement, Reg'l Convention & Sports Complex Auth. v. City of St. Louis, No. 1522-
CC00782, 2015 WL 7693059 at 9, 21 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2015). 
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At least two lawsuits have already been filed against the Rams football 
team in response to the announcement of the move to L.A.162 Four fans 
have filed a lawsuit to recover for themselves and other fans their expendi-
tures on team-branded merchandise over the last 15 years.163 They allege 
that Kroenke promised to keep the Rams in St. Louis and therefore they 
were defrauded.164 A second suit was filed by holders of Private Seat Li-
censes, “PSLs.” That suit claims that the holders of the PSLs have the right 
to purchase season tickets into the future and that the PSLs they hold do not 
designate a stadium in St. Louis.165 If successful, the plaintiffs then might 
be able to sell their PSLs to fans in L.A., where it is assumed the PSLs 
would be more valuable due to the larger population base.166 Even if the 
plaintiffs win both lawsuits, it is unlikely that it would stop the Rams move 
to L.A. At best, the suits, if successful, would make the departure more ex-
pensive.   
The L.A. pro football situation leads to two significant observations. 
First, there are situations where private funding of football stadiums can oc-
cur in a free market. Second, with limited teams available, even when a city 
is willing to spend over $400 million to build a new stadium, it may not be 
able to retain the team. Third, eliminating the anti-trust exemption from pro 
football might have resulted in a new expansion team being available to 
L.A., thereby avoiding most of the conflicts discussed in this subsection.  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO FREE AMERICAN CITIES FROM SPORT-
EXTORTION 
This section offers solutions to some of the controversies previously dis-
cussed. First, make bonds for such predominantly private uses fully taxable 
at the federal level, which sets an example for the states to also stop issuing 
tax-exempt bonds. According to a recent article, and consistent with the bil-
                                                             
162 John Breech, Rams Facing Two Lawsuits From Fans in St. Louis Over Move to L.A., CBS SPORTS 
(Jan. 21, 2016, 8:53 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/25457755/rams-facing-two-
lawsuits-from-fans-in-st-louis-kroenke-misread-situation. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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lion dollar subsidies noted above, there is a proposal on the table to do just 
that at the federal level.167 
Second, remove all anti-trust protections for pro sports. The basic argu-
ment is that the pro sports teams need to cooperate in order to have league 
play. However, there is a distinction between competition on the field and 
competition off the field. The agreements that appear to facilitate competi-
tion on the field can be the same cause of competition restriction off the 
field, leading to violations of anti-trust laws.168 It does not make sense to 
hold some leagues accountable while giving other leagues a free pass. It is 
possible for professional sports teams to compete on the field without the 
anti-trust protections that hinder economic competition off the field. The 
logic that anti-trust exemptions and protections promote competition within 
professional sports is flawed. Under this failed logic, the anti-trust laws 
would not be applied to the major auto manufacturers since they need to 
cooperate in order to compete in organized auto racing around the world.  
Third, a major public education campaign needs to be launched to further 
educate the public on the fallacy that building, or at least subsidizing, with 
public funds the construction of major sports stadiums contributes more to 
local economies than simply using existing tax dollars to support traditional 
public purposes. When public funds are used to build sports facilities, it is 
accomplished by reducing investment in other areas of government spend-
ing.169 This is confirmed with unequivocal statements like: “Yet, independ-
ent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly 
found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between 
sports facility construction and economic development.”170 Much can be 
accomplished with smart regulatory policies to encourage business devel-
opment that does not involve funding privately owned pro sports teams.  
Fourth, politicians and citizens in the states that have not enacted post-
Kelo legislation barring the use of the power of eminent domain for the                                                              
167 Elaine S. Povich, Is Obama Proposal the End of Taxpayer-Subsidized Sports Stadiums?, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 16, 2015, 1:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/16/stateline-
obama-proposal-taxpayer- subsidized-sports-stadiums/24845355/. 
168 Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the 
Market?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 263 (1993), 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1155&context=law_faculty_scholarship.   
169 See generally Sarah Wilhelm, Public Funding of Sports Stadiums (Univ. of Utah Ctr. for Pub. Policy 
& Admin., Policy Brief Apr. 30, 2008), http://gardner.utah.edu/_documents/publications/finance-
tax/sports-stadiums.pdf. 
170 John J. Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their Communities, 
14 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 95, 103 (2000). 
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benefit of private enterprises should enact such legislation. The Dallas 
Cowboys’ stadium and the New Jersey Nets arena were both built on land 
attained through eminent domain.171 And the trend continues as: “[T]hree 
more cities—Sacramento, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta—have all an-
nounced their readiness to use eminent domain to build new venues for 
their own professional sports franchises.”172 Preventing the taking of pri-
vate land for this purpose is hard to accomplish without legislation.173 
However, the United States Supreme Court has previously stated that courts 
are to give deference to the preferences of local legislatures on this mat-
ter.174 When public power cannot be used improperly to support private en-
terprise, this creates a more realistic situation for economic analysis. As 
discussed above, Los Angeles has two, and possibly a third, competing pri-
vate sector proposals for major stadiums on the table. Perhaps part of that 
rationale is the well-reported financial problems of the state of California. 
However, taking the option of public use of eminent domain off the table 
means the localities are less likely to be subjected to sport-extortion.  
Fifth, as long as the courts use a vague standard like the rule of reason, as 
explained above, pro sports teams may still escape the anti-trust rules and 
continue to extort both municipalities and their fans. Circuits differ in how 
they apply the rule of reason to professional sports leagues. An act that 
would typically violate anti-trust law may get upheld in the Ninth Circuit if 
no less restrictive means exist, or upheld in the District of Colombia Circuit 
Court of Appeals if the purpose of the alleged violation is not significantly 
anticompetitive.175 The solution to the vague application of the rule of rea-
son is to restructure the rule into categorical analysis that will allow for pre-
dictable anti-trust law application. 
Sixth, to avoid sport-extortion, community ownership of sports teams 
should be encouraged. Community ownership may be another key to re-
versing the current situation of sport-extortion. The Green Bay Packers are 
famously the only team that is owned by the community where it plays.176 
                                                             
171 Peter Montine, Forced Turnovers: Using Eminent Domain to Build Professional Sports Venues, 9 
WASH. J. L.,TECH. & ARTS 331, 331 (2014). 
172 Id. at 333. 
173 Id. at 346. 
174 Id. 
175 See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1396 
(9th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  
176 Dave Zirin, Those Non-Profit Packers, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/those-non-profit-packers. 
31
Schein et al.: American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Fran
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017 2
Richmond Public Interest Law Revi w, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/6
94 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  
 
112,000 shareholders own the team.177 The team has enjoyed stable man-
agement and sold out seasons, as well as success on the gridiron.178 Ironi-
cally, the community ownership model has been banned since 1960 when 
the NFL amended its Constitution to prevent non-profit ownership.179 By 
definition, it would be hard for a team to leave or extort its community if 
communities could be owners of some of the teams. “Compare this to other 
cities, where owners tend to maximize their own profits or simply leave the 
community at the drop of a hat.”180  
Seventh, the United States Council of Mayors’ has formed the Mayors 
Professional Sports Alliance.181 The description from the organization’s 
website is: 
The Mayors Professional Sports Alliance, chaired by Indianapolis Mayor 
Gregory A. Ballard, is composed of mayors from cities with major league 
sports teams - National Football League, National Basketball Association, Na-
tional Hockey League, Major League Baseball and Major League Soccer. Its 
mission is to share among the mayors information, resources, and support on 
issues related to professional sports and to work effectively with leagues, play-
ers and owners.182 
Acting in concert through such an organization, the mayors of cities 
throughout the United States could agree not to accede to sport-extortion. 
Clearly, if no city agrees to the extortion then teams will still need to be 
somewhere. Would a team leave New York City to relocate to Tallahassee, 
Florida? Teams would gravitate to where they can actually make money 
without public subsidies. There will be some disruption due to financial 
reasons as discussed in Part II of this article, but it is unlikely the financial 
impact would be anything like the present money grab taking place 
throughout America. 
CONCLUSION 
The authors of this Article are not ingenuous enough to expect that the 
suggested reforms above will all be enacted, or that even some of the re-                                                             
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. The rule is now found in the NFL Constitution of 1970. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. III § 3.2(A) (2006 Rev.), 
http://www.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf.   
180 James H. Miller, Report from the President, 8 WIS. POLICY RES. INST. REP. No. 9 (1995). 
181 See MAJOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS ALLIANCE, http://mayorcitysports.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
182 Id. 
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forms will be enacted in the near future. However, there is growing public 
resistance to the excesses documented in Parts I and II of this Article. 
Hopefully, this Article, the numerous articles and cases cited in this Article, 
and public pressure will lead to significant changes in the way pro sports 
are regulated in the United States. Further, that the expectation that the pub-
lic should finance even part of such large and profitable private enterprises 
will not persist.  
For future research, each stadium project that is built, in the process of 
being built, or proposed to be built, should be subjected to the most rigorous 
economic analysis. Promises of financial gains and employment opportuni-
ties for the host communities should be held to the highest standards of in-
dependent review. On a parallel track, legal scholars should perform a de-
tailed analysis of judicial decisions in major anti-trust and eminent domain 
cases and insure that such analyses are publicized to the bench and the 
Congress.  
 
 
Leagu
e 
Team 
Stadium 
Name 
City 
Yea
r  
Buil
t 
Cost 
Privat
e 
Funds 
Publi
c 
Fund
s 
%Publi
c 
Funds 
Owner 
NFL 
Minnesota 
Vikings 
New 
Viking's 
Stadium 
Minneapoli
s, MN 
2016 
1027 
M 
529 M 
498 
M 
48.5% 
Minnesota 
Sports 
Facilities 
Authority 
MLS 
San Jose 
Earthquake
s 
Avaya 
Stadium 
San Jose, 
CA 
2015 
100 
M 
100 M 0 0% 
Wolff & 
Fischer 
NFL 
San 
Francisco 
49ers 
Levi's 
Stadium 
Santa Clara, 
CA 
2014 
1310 
M 
1196 
M 
114 
M 
8.7% 
City of Santa 
Clara 
MLB 
Miami 
Marlins 
Marlins 
Park 
Miami, FL 2012 
634 
M 
125.2 
M 
508.8 80.3% 
Miami-Dade 
County 
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NBA 
Brooklyn 
Nets 
Barclays 
Center 
Brooklyn, 
NY 
2012 
1048 
M 
728 M 
320 
M 
30.5% 
Forest City 
Enterprises 
MLS 
Houston 
Dynamo 
BBVA 
Compass 
Stadium 
Houston, 
TX 
2012 95 M 60 M 35 M 36.8% 
AEG, Brener 
International 
Group, 
Golden Boy 
Promotions 
MLS 
Sporting 
Kansas 
City 
Sporting 
Park 
Kansas 
City, KS 
2011 
215 
M 
91 M 
124 
M 
57.7% 
Kansas 
Unified 
Developmen
t, LLC. 
NFL 
New York 
Giants / 
Jets 
MetLife 
Stadium 
East 
Rutherford
, NJ 
2010 
1600 
M 
1600 
M 
0 0% 
Giants 
Stadium 
LLC and 
Jets 
Developmen
t LLC 
MLB 
Minnesota 
Twins 
Target Field 
Minneapoli
s, MN 
2010 
545 
M 
195 M 
350 
M 
64% 
Hennepin 
County 
NBA 
Orlando 
Magic 
Amway 
Center 
Orlando, FL 2010 
480 
M 
60 M 
420 
M 
87.5% 
City of 
Orlando 
MLS 
New York 
Red Bulls 
Red Bull 
Arena 
Harrison, 
NJ 
2010 
222 
M 
111 M 
111 
M 
50% 
Red Bull 
Park, LLC 
MLS 
Philadelphi
a 
Union 
PPL Park Chester, PA 2010 
122 
M 
49 M 73 M 64% 
Delaware 
County 
Waterfront 
Improvemen
t Authority 
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NHL Penguins 
Consol 
Energy 
Center 
Pittsburgh, 
PA 
2010 
321 
M 
14.4 M 
306.6 
M 
95.5% 
Sports & 
Exhibition 
Authority of 
Pittsburgh 
and 
Allegheny 
County 
NFL 
Dallas 
Cowboys 
AT&T 
Stadium 
Arlington, 
TX 
2009 
1194 
M 
750 M 
444 
M 
37.2% 
Arlington, 
Texas 
MLB 
New York 
Mets 
Citi Field 
New York, 
NY 
2009 
800 
M 
103 M 
697 
M 
87.1% 
New York 
Mets 
MLB 
New York 
Yankees 
Yankee 
Stadium 
Bronx, New 
York 
2009 
1500 
M 
164 M 
1336 
M 
89.1% 
Yankee 
Stadium 
NFL 
Indianapoli
s 
Colts 
Lucas Oil 
Stadium 
Indianapolis
, IN 
2008 
719.6 
M 
100 M 
619.6 
M 
85.5% 
Indiana 
Stadium and 
Convention 
Building 
Authority 
MLB 
Washingto
n 
Nationals 
Nationals 
Park 
Washington
, DC 
2008 
611 
M 
73.3 M 
537.7 
M 
88% 
D.C. Sports 
Commission 
MLS 
Real Salt 
Lake 
Rio Tinto 
Stadium 
Sandy, UT 2008 
110 
M 
64.9 M 
45.1 
M 
41% 
Dell Loy 
Hansen 
MLS Toronto FC BMO Field 
Toronto, 
Canada 
2007 63 M 18.3 M 
44.7 
M 
71% 
Maple Leaf 
Sports & 
Entertainme
nt (MLSE) 
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MLS 
Colorado 
Rapids 
Dick’s 
Sporting 
Goods 
Park 
Commerce 
City, CO 
2007 
131 
M 
19.7 M 
111.4 
M 
85% 
City of 
Commerce 
City 
NHL Devils 
Prudential 
Center 
Newark, NJ 2007 
375 
M 
165 M 
210 
M 
56% 
David Blitzer 
and Joshua 
Harris 
NFL 
Arizona 
Cardinals 
University 
of Phoenix 
Stadium 
Glendale, 
AZ 
2006 
455 
M 
147 M 
308 
M 
67.7% 
Arizona 
Sports & 
Tourism 
Authority 
MLB 
St. Louis 
Cardinals 
Busch 
Stadium 
St. Louis, 
MO 
2006 
411 
M 
135.6 
M 
275.5 
M 
67% 
St. Louis 
Cardinals 
MLS Chelsea FC Toyota Park 
Bridgeview, 
IL 
2006 98 M 14.7 M 
83.3 
M 
85% 
Village of 
Bridgeview, 
Ill. 
NBA 
Charlotte 
Bobcats 
 
Time 
Warner 
Cable 
Arena 
Charlotte, 
NC 
2005 
265 
M 
0 
265 
M 
100% 
City of 
Charlotte 
MLS FC Dallas 
Toyota 
Stadium 
Frisco, TX 2005 
105 
M 
98.7 M 6.3 M 6% 
City of Frisco 
in 
partnership 
with Hunt 
Sports 
Group 
(HSG), the 
Frisco 
Independent 
School 
District, and 
Collin 
County 
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MLB 
Philadelphi
a Phillies 
Citizen’s 
Bank Park 
Philadelphi
a, PA 
2004 
458 
M 
229 M 
229 
M 
50% 
City of 
Philadelphia 
MLB 
San Diego 
Padres 
Petco Park 
San Diego, 
CA 
2004 
449 
M 
145.9 
M 
303.1 
M 
67.5% 
City of San 
Diego 
(70%), 
Padres 
(30%) 
NHL Jets MTS Centre 
Winnipeg, 
Canada 
2004 
133.5 
M 
93 M 
40.5 
M 
30.3% 
True North 
Sports and 
Entertainme
nt 
NFL 
Philadelphi
a Eagles 
Lincoln 
Financial 
Field 
Philadelphi
a, PA 
2003 
512 
M 
331 M 
181 
M 
35.4% 
City of 
Philadelphia 
MLB 
Cincinnati 
Reds 
Great 
American 
Ball Park 
Cincinnati, 
OH 
2003 
325 
M 
45 M 
280 
M 
86.2% 
Hamilton 
County 
NBA 
Houston 
Rockets 
Toyota 
Center 
Houston, 
TX 
2003 
202 
M 
0 
202 
M 
100% 
Harris 
County 
MLS LA Galaxy 
StubHub 
Center 
Carson, CA 2003 
150 
M 
150 M 0 0% 
Anschutz-
Entertainme
nt-Group 
NHL Coyotes 
Gila River 
[Jobing.co
m] Arena 
Glendale, 
AZ 
2003 
220 
M 
65 M 
155 
M 
70.5% 
City of 
Glendale 
NFL 
Detroit 
Lions 
Ford Field Detroit, MI 2002 
500 
M 
245 M 
255 
M 
51% 
Detroit/Wayn
e County 
Stadium 
Authority 
37
Schein et al.: American Cities Held Hostage: Public Stadiums and Pro Sports Fran
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017 8
Richmond Public Interest Law Revi w, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/6
100 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  
 
NFL 
Houston 
Texans 
NRG 
[Reliant] 
Stadium 
Houston, 
TX 
2002 
474 
M 
185 M 
289 
M 
61% 
Harris 
County 
NFL 
New 
England 
Patriots 
Gillette 
Stadium 
Foxborough
, MA 
2002 
325 
M 
253 M 72 M 22.2% Robert Kraft 
NFL 
Seattle 
Seahawks 
CenturyLin
k Field 
Seattle, WA 2002 
430 
M 
130 M 
300 
M 
69.8% 
Washington 
State Public 
Stadium 
Authority 
NBA 
San 
Antonio 
Spurs 
AT&T 
Center 
San 
Antonio, 
TX 
2002 
175 
M 
28.5 M 
146.5 
M 
83.7% Bexar County 
NFL 
Denver 
Broncos 
Sports 
Authority 
Field at 
Mile High 
Denver, CO 2001 
400.8 
M 
100.2 
M 
300.6 
M 
75% 
Denver 
Metropolita
n Football 
Stadium 
District 
(MFSD) 
NFL 
Pittsburgh 
Steelers 
Heinz Field 
Pittsburgh, 
PA 
2001 
280.8 
M 
122.8 
M 
158 
M 
56.3% 
City of 
Pittsburgh 
MLB 
Milwaukee 
Brewers 
Miller Park 
Milwaukee, 
WI 
2001 
413.9 
M 
120.4 
M 
293.5 
M 
70.9% 
Southeast 
Wisconsin 
Professional 
Baseball 
District, 
Milwaukee 
Brewers 
MLB 
Pittsburgh 
Pirates 
PNC Park 
Pittsburgh, 
PA 
2001 
262 
M 
50 M 
212 
M 
80.9% 
City of 
Pittsburgh 
Sports & 
Exhibition 
Authority 
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Appendix prepared by Karen Charis, MBA, under the direction of Dr. 
Schein, from publicly available sources updated through January 2016. 
NBA 
& 
NHL 
Dallas 
Mavericks 
& 
Stars 
American 
Airlines 
Center 
Dallas, TX 2001 
420 
M 
295 M 
125 
M 
29.8% City of Dallas 
NFL 
Cincinnati 
Bengals 
Paul Brown 
Stadium 
Cincinnati, 
OH 
2000 
449.8 
M 
24.7 M 
425.1 
M 
94.5% 
Hamilton 
County 
MLB 
San 
Francisco 
Giants 
AT&T Park 
San 
Francisco, 
CA 
2000 
357 
M 
342 M 15 M 4.2% 
China Basin 
Baseball 
Corporation 
MLB 
Detroit 
Tigers 
Comerica 
Park 
Detroit, MI 2000 
300 
M 
185 M 
115 
M 
38.3% 
Detroit/Wayn
e County 
Stadium 
Authority 
MLB 
Houston 
Astros 
Minute 
Maid Park 
Houston, 
TX 
2000 
268 
M 
88 M 
180 
M 
67.2% 
Harris 
County 
Sports 
Authority 
NBA 
Miami 
Heat 
American 
Airlines 
Arena 
Miami, FL 2000 
194 
M 
79.5 M 
114.5 
M 
59% 
Miami-Dade 
County 
NHL 
Blue 
Jackets 
Nationwide 
Arena 
Columbus, 
OH 
2000 
150
M 
0 
150 
M 
100% 
Franklin 
County 
Convention 
Facilities 
Authority 
NHL 
Minnesota 
Wild 
Xcel 
Energy 
Center 
St Paul, 
MN 
2000 
170 
M 
40 M 
130 
M 
76.5 % 
City of Saint 
Paul 
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